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Abstract
This paper seeks to evaluate the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI), official development
assistance (ODA), and migrant remittances to economic growth in developing countries, while
also taking into account the qualities of the institutions of the countries. This study uses the linear
system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) method as developed by Blundell and Bond
(1998). Current research has been focused on adding institutions to growth models to understand
how institutional quality can help improve outcomes in developing countries. This paper plans to
further the discussion on how institutional quality affects FDI, ODA, and remittances. Institutional
quality is measured using the World Governance Indicators, gathered by the World Bank. This
study finds that remittances and FDI are important to economic growth. The findings also suggest
that control of corruption may have an indirect effect on economic growth. Voice and
accountability was also positive when examining remittances as well.
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1.0 Introduction
Much of the focus of recent research in economic development has focused on how
institutions impact the effects of key developmental factors. Since the late 1990s, poor
institutional quality has been seen as a major barrier to economic growth for developing
countries. International organizations, as well as developed nations, have, as a result, been
imposing conditionalities that have forced developing nations to alter their institutions to become
more similar to those of the developed countries, focusing on maximizing market freedoms and
the protection of private property rights. This focus on institutions also manifests itself in the
high number of recent academic papers on the subject, some of which will be discussed in the
literature review section of this paper.
The importance of economic development in developing countries is further stressed by
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), created by the United Nations in 2000. The
purpose of these goals is to help reduce the divide in wealth between the developed countries and
the developing countries. The eight goals set out in 2000 were intended to be met by 2015. These
goals include the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger and the creation of a global
partnership for development. This has led to a greater focus on economic development, and may
be a major reason for the increased focus on institutional quality in developing countries in
studies looking at economic growth.
Recently, many studies have been using the linear generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimation method instead of using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The
methods are different, but both seek to estimate some unknown parameter and the effects that
certain other factors have on the parameter of interest. This study will use the system GMM, as
developed in Blundell and Bond (1998).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines recent trends in
economic development. Section 3 looks at some of the research on institutions and economic
development. Section 4 describes the data used in the model, as well as outlines the model that
will be used in this paper. Section 5 discusses the results of the regression, and section 6 is a
conclusion of the results.

2.0 Trend
The United Nations created the eight MDGs in 2000, with the goal of completing them
by 2015. The eight goals were to eliminate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal
primary education, reduce gender inequality and empower women, reduce infant mortality,
improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, ensure environmental
stability, and develop a global partnership for development. These goals aim to not only increase
growth in developing countries, but also seek real improvements in overall quality of life. Figure
1 shows the annual global GDP growth in annual percentage change terms from 2005 to 2013,
with projections for 2014 to 2017 for both the developing countries and for the developed
countries. With the exception of 2009, global GDP has been increasing each year, although the
rate of growth has slowed after the crisis as compared to before for both developed and
developing countries.
Figure 1: GDP Growth in Developed and Developing Countries

A common measure of quality of life is GDP per capita. While this measure is imperfect,
as it does not account for income inequality, it is still a useful measure for understanding how
large a country is in terms of not only its output but also its population. Typically, higher GDP
per capita means that people overall have higher incomes, allowing them to have higher rates of
consumption, and thus also higher quality of life. Figure 2 shows the global GDP per capita from
2005 to 2013. Based on the graph, the GDP per capita has been steadily increasing, with the
exception of 2009, which decreased, as did overall GDP, as a result of the global recession from
the 2008 financial crisis. After the crisis, the growth rate of GDP per capita flattens out, implying
that since the end of the financial crisis, the rate of GDP growth has slowed in relation to
population growth worldwide.
Figure 2: Annual GDP per Capita

Source: World Bank

Even though global GDP and GDP per capita have been increasing, the rate has not been
particularly high overall, and has slowed since the 2008 financial crisis. This slow-down in
economic growth complicates matters when it comes to determining the proper policies needed
to promote and sustainability. Since the financial crisis in 2008, it appears that there may have
been a consistent change in how certain factors normally operate within economies across the
board.
Another major concern when it comes to economic growth is the role of institutions.
While it is easily agreed that institutions and governments play an important role in economic

growth, the problem is how to measure institutional quality, and which kinds of institutions are
better for growth. Many of the developed countries have tried to impose their own values on the
developing countries, assuming that their method to success is the only way. This leads t oa
focus on maximizing individual liberties, protecting property rights, and a capitalistic system.
This may not be the most effective, however, as now there are examples of areas that are
succeeding at growing their economies without becoming democratic. Singapore, Hong Kong,
and China, for instance, have all seen substantial increases in GDP per capita, despite having
highly autocratic governments. The success of these countries calls into question the idea that
more freedom and better property rights leads to economic success.
3.0 Literature Review
There have been many studies conducted in recent years examining the relationship
between institutions and economic development. Tebaldi and Mohan (2010) studied the effects
of institutions on poverty by using eight different measures of institutional quality. They found
that better and more effective institutions reduced poverty through less income inequality. They
also found that less effective governments increased poverty due to a decrease in average
incomes as well as an increase in income inequality. Dias and Tebaldi (2012) looked into the
effects of human capital and institutional quality on economic growth. This study used a microfoundation model to establish the connection between human capital and institutions. The study
then, using panel data, tested the model, finding that structural institutions had a meaningful
impact on the growth of human capital, while political institutions did not. The study also found
that growth in human capital was a more important factor for economic growth than was the
level of human capital.
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) researched how infrastructure affected economic growth,
while also accounting for the influence of institutions on how inadequacies in a country’s
infrastructure were handled. The study found that the benefits to overall output of infrastructure
services was greater than the cost of the services. A few studies looked into the effects of
institutions on innovation in developing countries (Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008, 2013). The 2008
study had included economic growth in the analysis, and found that sustainable growth in human
capital increased economic growth, similar to the results found by Dias and Tebaldi (2012).

Tebaldi and Elmslie (2013) focused on the impact of institutions on innovation, finding that
institutions had a major impact on the production of new patents.
Catrinescu et al. (2006) examined the effects of remittances on economic growth using a
dynamic panel data estimation method, finding a weakly positive overall effect that is increased
by sound economic policies and institutions. Driffield and Jones (2013) also examined the effects
on economic growth of remittances, including FDI and ODA as well in their analysis, using
simultaneous equations to also determine what effects FDI, ODA, and remittances had on
economic growth. The study also included institutional variables in the model. The study found
that, after taking into account the effects of institutions, all foreign sources of capital have a
positive effect on growth. Rodrik (2000) attempted to find which institutions were the most
important for promoting economic growth. Based on the results from this study, they concluded
that local knowledge was key to determining how best to create the proper institutions necessary
for economic growth, and that participatory democracies were most effective at aggregating local
knowledge.
Rodriguez-Pose (2013) examined the question of the role of institutions on regional
development and how to include institutions in regional development models. This study found
that local institutions had a significant impact on economic growth and on the returns of
economic policies, but that any models involving institutions would suffer from a lack of what
defines a “good” institution over a “bad” one. The study concludes that “one-size-fits-all”
strategies for promoting economic development may be impossible, while strategies tailored to
specific regions may yield greater returns. Chang (2010) critically examines the recent research
on the role of institutions on economic growth, and found a number of critical flaws in many of
the studies. Some of the flaws highlighted in this study were the neglect of causality running
from development to institutions, the inability to see the impossibility of a free market, and a
belief in the freest market and strongest private property protections as the best policies for
economic growth. The study also critiques the methods that support these ideas as relying too
heavily on cross-sectional econometric studies, and that current discourse shows a poor
understanding of the changes in institutional quality.
Based on the above studies, while there is a large and growing body of literature on the
role of institutions on economic development, there are some issues, one of which being what
kinds of institutions are beneficial, as well as how to measure institutional quality. The methods

used to study the effect of institutions is also a key factor in how useful the literature is for
policy, and of particular importance is how institutions are factored into the models.
Driffield and Jones (2013) had used simultaneous equations in order to estimate their
model, since they felt that they did not have enough data to be able to use other methods of
dynamic panel data estimation. Dynamic panel data estimation analysis allows for the use of
some elements of time series regressions in a panel setting. Arellano and Bond (1991) developed
what is commonly referred to as the difference GMM for use with panel data with a few number
of time periods relative to a large number of panels, and includes the lagged dependent variable
in the model. In the estimation of the difference GMM, the first differences of each variable
rather than current values, is used in order to prevent non-stationary data from biasing the results.
This method was developed further by Blundell and Bond (1998) in a method referred to as a
system GMM. The system GMM runs two separate equations, one with the first differences, and
another with the levels, allowing for further specification within the model. Both the Arellano
and Bond (1991) method and the Blundell and Bond (1998) method are able to be used in both
one-step and two-step GMM processes. These methods of dynamic panel data estimation allows
for a better understanding of what is happening based on the data at hand, and will be used in this
study. The advantage of this method is that unbalanced data do not hurt the results too
significantly, and the small number of time periods and large number of panels is the kind of
dataset that these methods were designed to work with.
4.0 Data and Empirical Methodology
4.1 Data
The data is collected from the World Bank, and is divided up into four different income
categories. The four groups are Low, Lower Middle, Upper Middle, and High (non-OECD). Data
from each of the countries in these categories will be estimated using the models discussed in
more detail in the next section. The data on most of the variables were taken from the World
Development Indicators Database, with the exception of the institutional variables, which are
taken from the World Governance Indicators. The summary statistics for the variables are below
in Table 1. The data span from 2002 to 2013, and include all of the countries in the four nonOECD income groups, with the exclusion of some countries that could be potential outliers and
countries with a high number of gaps in the data. By excluding OECD countries, the study is

able to focus solely on developing countries. The absence of potential outliers prevents these
countries from skewing the results. Although the estimation method that will be used in this
study does allow for some gaps, the countries which were removed had very sparse data, or had
no data at all for certain statistics. This could lead to the exclusion of a significant amount of data
from the regression, making the results weaker. Although data is gathered for 2002 to 2013, the
first differencing and lagging of the variables eliminates at least the first two data points in the
data that will be used in the estimation of the models.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Obs

Mean

Control of corruption

1781

-.365857

Investment

1610

GDP per capita, % change

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

.7164779

-1.815871

2.416693

24.15406

9.407612

1.525177

116.204

1747

2.925279

5.838989

-62.46561

102.771

Government Expenditure

1232

6.551854

31.14778

-77.18118

830.9091

Trade

1648

92.5884

52.34923

21.67383

458.3322

Government effectiveness

1779

-.3569604

.7349793

-2.247729

2.429651

FDI inflows

1769

5.465381

7.288682

-19.37838

91.00733

ODA

1439

7.786633

12.0354

-2.611939

181.1872

Political stability

1777

-.2694283

.9422114

-3.184814

1.543135

Remittances

1488

5.653952

7.66

.000039

59.31354

Rule of Law

1787

-.369883

.7547636

-1.955725

1.772444

Regulatory quality

1779

-.3242688

.7619932

-2.675439

1.996294

Voice and accountability

1788

-.3026485

.8208616

-2.209712

1.345843

4.2 Empirical Model and Expected Results
The models used will follow the estimation methods as outlined in Blundell and Bond
(1998) to estimate the data using first differences and one lag of the variable of interest, using the
system GMM estimation method. The general model that will be estimated is displayed below.
GDPi,t = α + β0GDPi,t-1 + β1FDI + β2ODA + β3REM + β4GCF + β5GOVEXP + β6TRADE +
β7INSTITUTIONS +ϵi,t
In the above model, GDP is the percentage change in annual growth of GDP per capita,
FDI is measured by the net FDI inflows as a percent of GDP, ODA is measured by ODA inflows
as a percent of GNI, REM is measured by the inflows of remittances as a percent of GDP, GCF
is measured by the gross capital formation as a percent of GDP, and seeks to measure the level of
investment in each country. GOVEXP is the government expenditure as a percent of GDP, and
TRADE measures the level of trade openness (calculated as imports plus exports divided by
GDP). The institutional variables that will be included are control of corruption, regulatory
quality, and voice and accountability, each added into the model separately to prevent the high
correlation between these variables from biasing the results. Each of the variables also will have
one lag included in the first difference equation, following the Blundell and Bond (1998)
method. The expected results are listed below in Table 2.

Table 2: Expected Results
Variable

Expected Sign

Significance

FDI

+

Yes

ODA

+

Yes

Remittances

+/-

Yes

Investment

+

Yes

Government Expenditure

+

Yes

Trade Openness

+/-

No

Control of Corruption

+

Yes

Government effectiveness

+

Maybe

Political stability and absence of violence

+

Maybe

Rule of law

+

Maybe

Regulatory quality

+

Maybe

Voice and accountability

+/-

Yes

Each of the variables are expected to have some positive effect on economic growth, with
the exception of remittances and voice and accountability, which may be either positive or
negative. Remittances could either encourage laziness from workers, or bolster spending from
poor families receiving the help of family members working in another country. Voice and
accountability measures the freedom of the press and media, and a more free press and media
may undermine the effectiveness of the government or undercut support for it, which could
reduce economic growth. After testing for multicollinearity among the institutional variables, the
only institutional variables that will be used of the ones listed above will be control of
corruption, regulatory quality, and voice and accountability. Control of corruption is important
due to the effect of corruption on inflows of capital into a country, with worse control of
corruption reducing the amount of investment in the country. Regulatory quality is highly
correlated with government effectiveness and rule of law, so it will be used to determine the
overall impact of the legal system and regulatory environment on economic growth. Voice and
accountability is an important variable to see whether or not freedom of speech helps or hurts
developing countries. All of the variables will be included in the GMM-style equations. The IV-

style equations (in levels only) will include a time dummy for 2009, associated with the negative
global economic growth from the 2008 financial crisis in the developing countries.
Some of the variables used in this model may not be strictly exogenous to the model.
This possibility of endogenous variables included in the model would bias an OLS regression, as
would non-stationary data-generating processes in the variables included. Each of the variables
will be estimated in the first difference, since each of the variables is assumed to be generated by
a non-stationary stochastic process, as many economic variables are. The institutional variables
may also potentially be strictly exogenous. To test for endogeneity, these variables will be
included in both the GMM-style equations, and the IV-style equations. The estimation results
will also be accompanied by the results of the overidentification tests, both the Sargan test and
the Hansen test, and the Arellano-Bond AR tests.
5.0 Empirical Results
As discussed in section 4, the three institutional variables of interest will be included in
the model separately. The results of the models with the institutional variables included with the
GMM-style instruments are displayed in Appendix A, and the results of the models with the
institutional variables included in the IV-style instruments are included in Appendix B. The first
model in each set of regressions is the same, and includes none of the institutional variables, to
serve as a baseline for comparison. Each model is estimated using the two-step system GMM,
with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample standard error correction and collapsed instrument
matrices.
One of the most notable results is that of the time dummy for 2009. This year had a very
strongly negative effect on GDP, as a result of the global economic slowdown that occurred after
the financial crisis. This result was very consistent across each of the models run. In the baseline
model, model (1), only government expenditure and investment are statistically significant.
Trade openness, despite being small, negative, and statistically insignificant, is still an important
variable to include. Interestingly, ODA was small, negative, and statistically insignificant in each
model that it was included in.
In the models with the institutional variables included with the GMM-style instruments
(models (2), (3), and (4)), control of corruption and regulatory quality had little effect on the
values of the coefficients of the other variables, and were insignificant. In model (2), which

included control of corruption, the P-value for trade openness was noticeably lower, however.
Other than that, models (2) and (3) had results that were very similar to those in model (1). Of
these three models, the one with the most meaningful results is model (4), which included voice
and accountability. Not only was voice and accountability statistically significant at the 10%
level, but including this variable in the model also made remittances show a larger effect and
statistically significant at the 10% level and government expenditure insignificant. This model
showed strong positive effects from both remittances and voice and accountability.
In the models with the IV-style instruments including the institutional variables (models
(5), (6), and (7)), none of the institutional variables had a significant impact on the model.
Control of corruption (included in model (5)) was closer to being statistically significant, and, as
in model (2), made the trade openness variable closer to being significant. Based on these results,
control of corruption appears that it may have some weak effect on economic growth, but
probably not in a direct way. The results reveal little about the effectiveness of regulatory quality
on impacting economic growth. Voice and accountability does appear to have a strong positive
effect on economic growth, especially in conjunction with remittances.
Of the sources of foreign capital, FDI and ODA were mostly consistent and statistically
insignificant. Remittances was insignificant in all of the models except for (4). FDI and
remittances were always positive and larger than ODA in absolute terms, while ODA was always
rather small and negative. Based on these results, FDI appears to have a weak positive effect on
economic growth and remittances have a slightly stronger positive effect on economic growth.
The results on ODA show a lack of significant effects on economic growth from ODA, however.
The Sargan tests for overidentification find that the results are not robust, but also not
weakened by too many instruments. However, having too many instruments also weakens the
Sargan test, which may be the reason for this result. The Hansen test, on the other hand, finds the
estimates robust, but weakened by too many instruments. The P-value on the Hansen test for
each model varies between 0.325 and 0.358, with the exception of model (4), which has a Pvalue of 0.424. The higher P-value on the Hansen test on model (4) may mean that voice and
accountability being included in the GMM-style instruments may cause a greater problem of
having too many instruments in the model. This implies that the results from model (4) may have
been weaker, which may explain why government expenditure had become insignificant at the
10% level in model (4).

6.0 Conclusion
In conclusion, the results of this study find that FDI and remittances have a fairly weak
positive effect on economic growth, a result that is consistent with the literature. The effects of
ODA, however, were not found to be significant. Of the institutional variables examined, control
of corruption had shown that it may have some indirect effect on economic growth, while
regulatory quality was not found to have any significant effects. Voice and accountability was
found to have a fairly strong positive effect, especially alongside remittances. Overall, the effect
of foreign capital has a net positive effect on economic growth, and better institutions can help to
further this positive effect. Based on these results, developing nations should seek to improve the
qualities of their institutions as it relates to control of corruption and voice and accountability as
a means of furthering economic growth, while also encouraging more FDI and remittances.

Appendix A – Results with Institutional variables in GMM Instruments
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
GDP per capita
GDP per capita
GDP per capita
GDP per capita
growth
growth
growth
growth
GDP per capita
0.293***
0.285***
0.291***
0.293***
growth (lagged)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Investment

0.0498**
(0.019)

0.0544***
(0.007)

0.0631***
(0.007)

0.0585***
(0.006)

Government
Expenditure

0.0604*

0.0505*

0.0542**

0.0426

(0.057)

(0.089)

(0.036)

(0.170)

Trade Openness

-0.00975
(0.516)

-0.0129
(0.386)

-0.00111
(0.930)

-0.00839
(0.536)

FDI

0.0232
(0.646)

0.0256
(0.627)

0.0183
(0.695)

0.0139
(0.767)

Remittances

0.0884
(0.193)

0.0947
(0.208)

0.0793
(0.216)

0.115*
(0.071)

ODA

-0.0137
(0.581)

-0.00906
(0.728)

-0.0111
(0.671)

-0.00625
(0.796)

Time Dummy for
2009 (crisis)

-3.292***

-3.363***

-3.250***

-3.268***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

1.444

Control of
Corruption

(0.250)
0.870
(0.474)

Regulatory Quality

2.178*

Voice and
Accountability

Constant
N

(0.069)
2.105*
(0.082)
696

p-values in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

3.126**
(0.041)
696

1.722
(0.150)
696

2.712**
(0.038)
696

Appendix A (Continued): Overidentification Tests
Overidentification
(1)
(2)
(3)
Tests (P-values)
Arellano-Bond
0.001
0.001
0.001
Test for AR(1)
Arellano-Bond
0.749
0.728
0.695
Test for AR(2)
Sargan Test
0.000
0.000
0.000
Hansen Test
0.358
0.325
0.329

(4)
0.001
0.706
0.000
0.424

Appendix B – Results with Institutional variables in IV Instruments
(1)
(5)
(6)
(7)
GDP per capita
GDP per capita
GDP per capita
GDP per capita
growth
growth
growth
growth
GDP per capita
0.293***
0.292***
0.293***
0.294***
growth (lagged)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Investment

0.0498**
(0.019)

0.0504**
(0.024)

0.0512**
(0.018)

0.0503**
(0.020)

Government
Expenditure

0.0604*

0.0583*

0.0586*

0.0630*

(0.057)

(0.062)

(0.062)

(0.051)

Trade Openness

-0.00975
(0.516)

-0.0141
(0.348)

-0.0101
(0.498)

-0.00885
(0.557)

FDI

0.0232
(0.646)

0.0252
(0.637)

0.0243
(0.632)

0.0204
(0.688)

Remittances

0.0884
(0.193)

0.102
(0.178)

0.0935
(0.169)

0.0967
(0.169)

ODA

-0.0137
(0.581)

-0.00934
(0.707)

-0.0101
(0.676)

-0.0130
(0.598)

Time Dummy for
2009 (crisis)

-3.292***

-3.335***

-3.298***

-3.280***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.661

Control of
Corruption

(0.177)
0.356
(0.375)

Regulatory Quality

0.198

Voice and
Accountability

constant
N

(0.482)
2.105*
(0.082)
696

p-values in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

2.735**
(0.046)
696

2.216*
(0.078)
696

2.057*
(0.092)
696

Overidentification
Tests (P-values)
Arellano-Bond
Test for AR(1)
Arellano-Bond
Test for AR(2)
Sargan Test
Hansen Test

Appendix B (Continued): Overidentification Tests
(1)
(5)
(6)

(7)

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.749

0.750

0.745

0.744

0.000
0.358

0.000
0.336

0.000
0.353

0.000
0.343
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